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Abstract 
The study reports an unsuccessful adoption of information systems in a joint venture initiative. 
It proposes a knowledge transfer perspective to reconsider information systems adoption. 
According to this viewpoint, Information systems may be implemented successfully but the 
internalization can still be ineffective, leading to ultimate adoption failure. IS adoption may 
fail because the knowledge, embedded in information systems, emerged from the source side, 
is incongruent with the actual practice (knowledge) enacted from the situated context in the 
recipient side. A major implication of this research is that, to ensure IS adoption success, it is 
important to examine the embedded practice (knowledge) and its situated contexts between 
the source and recipient party. 
 
Keywords: IS adoption, Knowledge transfer perspective, Internalization 
 
1. Introduction 
What impedes IS (information systems) adoption? Previous literature has explored barriers, 
diffusion, and social forces inhibiting system adoption. However, a less explored dimension 
is how the knowledge embedded in information systems may influence adoption in a given 
organizational context, of which the system is originated from. This study seeks to provide a 
contextualist analysis of information systems adoption (based on Kostova, 1999). Specifically, 
this study investigates information systems implemented in a Sino-German joint venture in 
China.  
This paper considers information systems adoption as a knowledge transfer process and 
explains the impediment stemming from the source and recipient contexts (Attewell, 1992; 
Kostova, 1999; Orlikowski et al., 1995). This offers a unique contribution to IS literature. The 
difficulty of IS adoption is examined through the developmental dynamics of implementation 
and internationalization, across two organizational contexts. This paper seeks to analyze the 
embedded practices (i.e. knowledge, values and assumptions) underlying a given information 
system and emphasizes that IS adoption requires a close examination of its embedded 
knowledge emerged from its situated context. Our research suggested that failure to 
acknowledge such contextual incongruence may cause insurmountable adoption difficulties 
and eventually continual IS failures may ensue. 
2. Research Framework 
There are two discernable streams of IS adoption research. The first is devoted to 
identifying factors associated with IS adoption difficulties. For instance, Davis (1989) 
suggested a technology acceptance model in which perceived usefulness and perceived ease 
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of system use determines user’s acceptance of information systems. DeLone & McLean 
(1992) explained problems that may cause IS failure: system quality, information quality, IS 
usage, user satisfaction, individual impact, and organizational impact. Sauer (1993) 
summarized 12 categories of factors consist of user involvement, top management 
commitment, value bias, mutual understanding of business needs between the technologist 
and user, design quality, system performance, project management effectiveness, resources 
adequacy, situational stability, management control processes, implementation process, and 
individual difference. However, these studies failed to recognize that IS implementations are 
often dynamic, and that the state of specific factors can change in the course of technological 
adoption (Akkermans and van Helden, 2002). 
A second research strand stresses the role of social actions embedded in the organizational 
context. Four useful perspectives have emerged to address this issue: organizational politics, 
organizational culture, institutional theory, and organizational learning (Robey and Boudreau, 
1999). The analyses of politics, culture and institutional forces are not mutually exclusive. In 
many situations, these forces interact with each other in IS failure projects. An example is the 
London Ambulance Service’s IS adoption failure (Beynon-Davis, 1995). This case study 
examined the adoption of a Computer Aided Dispatch System in terms of exchange 
relationships among the project organization, stakeholders and the environment. The resulting 
failure was analyzed in relation to the climate of mistrust, the unproductive culture of the 
London Ambulance Service, and the industry’s political behavior. 
However, the extant literature is insensitive to an alternative perspective which analyzes IS 
adoption difficulties with regards to the embedded knowledge and situated context. Attewell 
(1992) noted that firms fail to adopt information systems effectively because the knowledge 
needed to use such systems is acquired much more slowly and with considerably more 
difficulties. The users may have to spend several years developing an understanding of its 
embedded knowledge before assimilating the systems into their work routines. Robey, Ross 
& Boudreau (2002) highlighted two types of embedded knowledge in ERP (Enterprise 
Resource Planning) systems. The first barrier is related to “configuration knowledge” (related 
to system features). For example, most adoption difficulties stemmed from the lack of 
distributing configuration knowledge throughout the organization. On the other hand, 
“assimilation knowledge” is related to learning new work processes and technology-induced 
changes. This involves teaching the concepts of new process-orientation as well as providing 
training addressing broader organizational changes so that users may assimilate the integrated 
knowledge of new systems, structures and processes. 
Kumar, van Dissel, and Bielli (1998) examined the adoption difficulty of an electronic 
marketplace called SPRINTEL in Prato, Italy. In this case, IS adoption failure needs to be 
understood in terms of the basic cultural differences between American and Italian societies. 
The research indicated that the adoption of an electronic marketplace is not only a matter of 
technology application but also involves transferring incongruent social values which define 
how interpersonal trusts and economic exchange are developed. Pratesian traders relied more 
on reputation mechanisms to produce trust in business exchange, rather than on the market 
mechanism (impersonal trust) embedded in the technology (developed by the American 
designers). 
Lam (1997) pointed out that the nature of embedded knowledge is affected by its situated 
context. She found that knowledge transfer between a British and a Japanese electronics 
company is significantly influenced by knowledge that is embedded in three different situated 
contexts: education system (of a particular society), production process (e.g. sequential vs. 
overlapping), and community (i.e. whether knowledge is transmitted via formal 
documentation or informal socialization) contexts.  
Mitev (1996) provided an empirical substantiation of embedded knowledge. She 
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investigated French Railways’ computerized reservation system, SOCRATE (Système Offrant 
à la clientèle des Réservations d’Affaires et de Tourisme en Europe). The adoption was 
unsuccessful because the imposition of a technological solution resulted in unproductive 
power play between the managers and the staffs, leading to a strike by railway staff 
(relational context). The implementer failed to acknowledge that SOCRATE resulted in a 
drastic change in the staff’s work patterns and career promotional structures (organizational 
context). Moreover, SOCRATE adopted the American airlines reservation systems (SABRE) 
to French railways. The railway station as the basic unit of system design was replaced by a 
concept of relationship between two stations, which is embedded in SABRE’s design. 
SOCRATE had 22,000 relationships and 2,400 railway stations, whereas SABRE only had 80 
relationships. The ticketing systems and price policies introduced through SOCRATE 
radically changed railways users’ traveling behavior and rail workers’ practices, which are 
grounded in important cultural dimension of French society (industry and societal context). 
The failure was thus revealing through an analysis of embedded knowledge and situated 
context. 
In a similar vein, Kostova (1999) analyzed knowledge transfer in cross-organizational 
context (from parent company to subsidiaries) and suggested that the success or failure of 
knowledge transfer is determined by the outcome of implementation (i.e. how well the 
systems are implemented technically) and internalization (i.e. how well the systems are 
integrated with the internal processes and values). The outcomes are affected largely on the 
relational, organizational and societal context between the source and recipient sides. In the 
relational context, the influencing factors include commitment, trust, and identity. In the 
organizational context, corporate culture, institutional mechanism (i.e. whether the institution 
facilitate learning and change), and compatibility of transferred practice are the three 
prominent factors. In the societal context, the acceptance of practice is determined by 
regulative, cognitive, and normative institutional environment. For Kostova’s (1999) 
conception, the effectiveness of transfer depends on whether the recipient has a psychological 
ownership of then transferred practice. However, while Kostova (1999) stressed the influence 
of contextual factors on the acceptance of practice, she was insensitive to how the new 
practice can be internalized with the recipient’s existing processes, structure, and values. 
The concept of knowledge embeddedness and situated context offers two major 
implications to IS adoption. First, information systems are not simply static, technical 
artifacts (Orlikowski and Iacono, 2001). Every system is embedded with certain 
configuration and assimilation knowledge, of which certain value systems might be 
“inscribed” (Knights, Noble, and Willmott, 1997). Second, such embedded knowledge is 
emerged from its situated context over time. Knowledge emerged from one context may not 
be accepted readily by people who gain their knowledge stemming from an incongruent 
context (Nidumolu et al., 2001; Orlikowski et al., 1995; Schultze and Boland, 2000). 
Consequently, the success or failure of IS adoption is determined by whether its embedded 
knowledge is congruent with the recipient’s situated context. This concept is depicted in 
Figure 1, a research framework employed by the present research. 
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Figure 1. An Analysis of IS Adoption from a Knowledge Transfer Perspective 
Implementation
Internalization
The congruence of knowledge (practices) 
between the two contexts determines the 
outcome of transfer
Source
Societal context
Organizational context
Relational context
Information systems
used in the source 
situated in
Knowledge (practice) 
embedded in the systems
Recipient
Societal context
Organizational context
Relational context
Information systems 
adopted by the recipient
situated in
Actual knowledge (practice)
enacted from the recipient’s context
 
 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Site selection 
The selected case is called BeijingAir (a disguised name), based in China. BeijingAir was 
the recipient firm which initiated a joint venture with GermanAir (the source; pseudonym) 
over a period of 15 years. The aim was to transfer GermanAir’s best practices to BeijingAir. 
The scope of transfer includes organizational structure, aircraft maintenance expertise, human 
resource systems, information systems, and other managerial knowledge. 
In October 2003, in order to improve its working efficiency within MRO (Maintenance, 
Repair, and Operation) process, BeijingAir, at the suggestion of GermanAir, implemented the 
SAP systems (for MRO), following GermanAir’s own successful implementation of a similar 
system. However, the same system and the same implementation process do not lead to the 
anticipated result. Instead, a system which was valuable at GermanAir was found to be 
unacceptable by BeijingAir’s employees. This case thus offers a rich context to analyze IS 
adoption in the background of knowledge transfer. 
 
3.2. Data collection and analysis 
We visited the research site in April (2003) and the other in January (2004). Each visit 
lasted 10 days. In-depth interviews were conducted with various key persons associated with 
the SAP implementation. In BeijingAir, interviewees included Chinese managers and 
engineers, as well as German managers. The interviews were audio taped by the interviewers. 
In total, 40 interviews were conducted during the two visits. In addition to the interview data, 
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we collected documentation and reports referring to SAP implementation in BeijingAir. We 
asked questions with reference to the research framework (Figure 1). For instance, we 
explored how the SAP systems were used in the GermanAir by asking the German managers 
how the systems were supported by the relational (how people collaborate), organizational 
(how the systems were used to support GermanAir’s existing practices), and societal 
(industrial background and educational systems in the German society) contexts. We then 
asked the Chinese managers and engineers about the problems encountered during the 
systems adoption period (from October 2003 to January 2004). On this basis, we traced how 
the systems might be incongruent with the actual practice within BeijingAir. Then, we asked 
the subjects to explain how the practices (knowledge) were situated in the existing relational, 
organizational, and societal contexts in BeijingAir and Chinese society in general. Our goal is 
to identify the incongruence between the knowledge embedded in the systems (employed in 
GermanAir) and the knowledge enacted from the actual practices (in BeijingAir). We analyze 
such knowledge incongruence by relating to the three levels of context in the respective 
company. 
 
4. Research Findings 
4.1. Company background 
BeijingAir was a subsidiary of a state-owned aircraft maintenance company, initially with 
the capability of providing maintenance service to Soviet-made aircrafts. As the Soviet-made 
aircrafts were gradually replaced by aircraft manufactured in the US and Europe, the firm 
needed to acquire new maintenance know-how. BeijingAir initiated a joint venture with 
GermanAir, a world-famous aircraft maintenance corporation which has good reputation of 
high efficiency and quality aircraft maintenance. By collaborating with GermanAir, 
BeijingAir had made significant growth. By 2003, BeijingAir’s service capacity had extended 
to line maintenance of Boeing 737, 747, 757, 767, 777, MD11, Airbus A340, to aircraft 
overhaul of Boeing 737, 747, 767, 777, in addition to engine overhauls.  
However, BeijingAir also encountered some roadblocks. One of the biggest challenges 
was low productivity. For example, it only took 35 days to complete a D check of Boeing 747 
in GermanAir, while in BeijingAir it required 55 days. The extra 20 days not only meant 
addition cost but loss of revenues (about ￥16,000,000 loss for 20 days). An internal 
investigation found that the order management process in BeijingAir was ineffective. It often 
took 3-4 days to order a component. However, in GermanAir, with the support of SAP 
systems (for MRO), the process could be completed in one day. Following GermanAir’s 
suggestion, in October 2003, BeijingAir implemented SAP to replace its old information 
system MAVIS, with the assistance of a domestic system integrator.  
On 1 October 2003, the SAP implementation included financial management, ordering 
systems, and personnel management. Surprisingly, after three months, engineers in 
BeijingAir found that the SAP systems took them even more working days to order a 
component than the old systems. As one project manager noted a typical problem: 
 
Using MAVIS, it may take three days to order an axletree. If the axletree is urgent, 
we can send the order form to the material department personally and it can save 
some time. But using the new system, all processes should be done on computers. 
However, the new system does not support multiple users operating 
simultaneously. Often, we cannot make an order through SAP because other 
people are online. The situation becomes worsen. It took us 6-7 days to order a 
part. If it is an urgent ordering, we run the risk of operational disruption. 
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The German managers were perplexed by such complaints. Back in Germany, the SAP 
systems were used effectively to facilitate inter-departmental collaboration. The outcome 
could be translated into shortened turn-around-time (TAT) of aircraft maintenance. Most 
German managers considered the adoption failure was due to the cultural inertia situated in 
BeijingAir. They perceived that the organizational culture was not conducive to effective 
collaboration like their German parent company and most Chinese engineers were unable to 
take up required responsibilities. For example, one German manager explained a common 
problem: 
 
In GermanAir, if we order parts, our engineers will follow through. They will fill 
in the forms, constantly checking whether the parts have arrived. If anything goes 
wrong, they will make sure alternative parts are ready for overhaul in time. But, 
in BeijingAir, the engineers fill in the forms and the job is considered done. They 
never follow up and take further actions. The SAP systems won’t work if no one 
wants to take any responsibility. 
However, can the adoption failure really be attributed solely to the organizational cultural 
issues? Are these Chinese engineers really ineptitude and unable to afford responsibility? The 
research shows otherwise. The following sections compare the knowledge embedded in the 
SAP systems with the practice enacted from BeijingAir. The comparison is analyzed with 
reference to relational, organizational and societal context between the two parties. 
 
4.2. Societal Context 
BeijingAir historically was a state-own company where political agenda has a higher 
priority than organizational performance. In this social system, the inter-departmental 
collaboration was hindered by a dual management system in which the managers execute job 
routines and a party secretary was placed in each major division (for facilitate the execution 
of political agenda). As a result, the coordination mechanisms were fragmented to serve the 
purpose of managerial control. This control system was still evident in 2003 even when the 
organizational structure was replaced with that of GermanAir. 
Moreover, there were many clone products circulated in the aircraft component market in 
China. The quality of these components was not incomparable to those of established 
suppliers. BeijingAir, with limited capital, was required to strike a balance between quality 
and price. BeijingAir had to buy components a list of suppliers whose products can satisfy the 
quality requirement as well as the price requirement. But the firm also needed to protect the 
confidentiality. Meanwhile, it was a mandate to ensure that low quality clone components 
would not come from the “back door.” Additionally, BeijingAir believed that employees 
might destroy the system inadvertently or steal confidential information from the system, if 
everyone was given access to the SAP systems. Components were very expensive. Any 
wrong order would cause cost overrun to BeijingAir. Hence, there were many auditing 
procedures to oversee each order placed and the ordering form of spare parts was very 
complex, compared to that of GermanAir. For control purpose, only a small number of 
engineers could have the permission to order components through the SAP systems. These 
engineers were also afraid to take any responsibility because any mistakes made could mean 
a career liability in the organization. The complex order forms, privileged access to the 
information systems, lack of responsible staff, and convoluted auditing procedures were in 
many ways incompatible with the practices assumed in the SAP systems. 
In contrast, in GermanAir, every engineer was given the permission to use the SAP 
systems to order parts. The German firm assumed their engineers were trustworthy; they 
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would not steal parts by placing ghost orders; they were reliable in data entry; and they would 
order parts with discretion (by considering the cost and efficiency factors proactively). In 
GermanAir, any engineer could place order directly to the SAP systems and needed not to fill 
in extra manual forms.  
Back to BeijingAir, the ordering forms were filled manually. Through two to three 
auditing procedures, the forms were sent to the selected engineers for data entry in the SAP 
systems. The SAP systems were also redesigned so that only one person is allowed to use the 
system at a particular time. After data entry, there was another auditing procedure to ensure 
information integrity before the electronic order was formally issued. This thus induced 
significant delays and system downtimes. 
 
4.3. Organizational context 
In BeijingAir, the order placement center was spread over various production departments. 
This decentralized organizational structure is not compatible with the ordering management 
principle in the SAP systems, which emphasizes centralized ordering management. For 
example, the employees who are responsible for ordering engine parts are based in Engine 
Service Division. The employees who are responsible for ordering airframe parts were 
assigned to the Aircraft Overhaul Division. In this organization, they had to cross-order parts 
from other departments, which increase the complexity of coordination and order 
management. If the engineers from Aircraft Overhaul Division needed to order an engine 
component, they had to collaborate with the order-processing unit in Engine Service Division. 
The engineers of ordering subunit in the Engine Service Division often would give a lower 
priority in other division’s requests than their own division, even for some urgent parts. The 
longer lead-time of order processing, the longer the turnaround time in the aircraft 
maintenance project, as one project engineer (in Aircraft Overhaul Division) remarked: 
 
For the components in airframe, we can process the ordering forms in our own 
ordering subunit. The ordering time will not take too long. But we have no 
control over parts processed by other ordering units. They always say that they 
have a lot of urgent ordering forms to deal with, but they do not know how urgent 
the part is in our division. In this situation, we can do nothing but waiting. 
In GermanAir, the organizational principle supported every employee to place orders in 
real time manner. The ordering forms are centralized in a special unit, called Material 
Department. The electronic ordering forms would be transferred to this department through 
the SAP systems. The engineers could integrate the ordering forms and allocate collectively 
the priorities for each order. For the urgent orders, they would give them top priority by 
contracting suppliers immediately. GermanAir also had excellent supplier networks. In 
average, the urgent orders could be fulfilled within one day and the regular orders could be 
completed within two days, in contrast to weeks in BeijingAir. 
 
4.4. Relational context 
In BeijingAir, the engineer preferred informal personal communication and were not used 
to writing formal documentations. Most of the documentations were not written 
professionally. The data-entry engineer had to trace back and check with the person who 
initiated the ordering documentations because the writings were almost incomprehensible. 
This re-checking procedure consumed a lot of time but it was necessary because, if this 
procedure was neglected, unclear documentations could cause wrong data entry and thus 
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more trouble.  
The SAP systems assumed that the engineer was capable of producing accurate data entry. 
In GermanAir, most engineers were known for their “German Thoroughness” in writing 
technical documentations, even though English was not their first language. The German 
engineers tended to be task-oriented. In contrast, the Chinese engineers emphasize more of 
Guanxi (relationships) building and thus tended to prefer personal “chitchats” than formal 
communications. For them, the SAP systems seemed to make their socialization impersonal. 
 
5. Discussion 
This study attempts to offer an initial assessment of IS adoption difficulties by considering 
IS adoption as a process of knowledge transfer. It stresses the importance of the embedded 
knowledge and situated context. Under this assumption, IS adoption may fail because the 
knowledge, embedded in information systems, emerged from the source side, are incongruent 
with the actual practice (knowledge) enacted from the situated context in the recipient side. 
The selected case helps us understand why the adopted information systems may be 
implemented effectively but fail to be internalized within the recipient organization. A major 
implication of this research is that, to ensure IS adoption success, it is important to examine 
the embedded practice (knowledge) and its situated contexts between the source and recipient 
party. 
Furthermore, this study also offers an opportunity to rethink Kostova’s (1999) framework. 
Kostova (1999) concentrates mainly on the external conditions that constrain the acceptance 
of strategic practice (e.g. TQM practice) in the recipient side, within the parent-subsidiary 
context. She also treats implementation and internalization as the outcome of transfer, based 
on the adopter’s perception (whether the user is committed and satisfied). Our analysis goes 
beyond seeing “context” solely as the external conditions and considers the interactions 
between knowledge embedded in information systems and its situated contexts (where the 
knowledge is developed; see Orlikowski et al., 1995; Orlikowski, 2000). Internalization is 
considered not just as the user’s perceived acceptance of the transferred practice but also as 
the extent to which the knowledge embedded in the IS can be integrated into the recipient’s 
organizational processes, structures, and value systems. This requires a mutual revision of 
technology and organization. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study offers an alternative approach to examine IS adoption. By using knowledge 
transfer conception, researchers are encouraged to examine the embedded knowledge and 
situated context in order to explore the issues underlying information systems adoption, in 
contrast to the previous works on barrier removals and social analyses of IS adoption. The 
future work of this research may extend the scope of investigation and analyze various 
information systems adopted in this joint venture. This may help to refine the research 
framework used in this article. 
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